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Keller: Waiving Privileges Without Coercion

COMMENT

CORPORATE COOPERATION IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS:
WAIVING PRIVILEGES
WITHOUT COERCION
INTRODUCTION

In response to major corporate scandals such as Enron's in 2001,1
government investigation of corporate misconduct has become
increasingly proactive. 2 Corporations that cooperate with government
agencies and willingly "clean house" following suspected or actual
illegal activity may be rewarded with reduced penalties under sentencing
I See generally John R. Kroger, Enron. Fraud. and Securities Reform: An Enron
Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 57, 58-60 (2005) ("When Enron went bankrupt on
December 2, 200 I, after stunning revelations about the company's insider deals and faulty
accounting, some 4,500 Enron workers had lost their jobs in Houston alone. Enron's employees,
who had been encouraged to place their retirement savings in Enron stock, lost some $1.3 billion in
401(k) accounts. Nationwide, Enron's countless investors, who had seen the stock price decline
over the course of the year from eighty-four dollars to mere pennies per share, lost some $61 billion.
This disaster occurred largely because ofa troubling gap between perception and reality.").
2 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response,
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PLUCoRP 331, 333 (2007). For example, in 2002, President Bush
established a Corporate Fraud Task Force to oversee all corporate fraud matters under investigation
by the DOJ and to coordinate with federal regulatory agencies towards civil enforcement. Second
Year Report to the President. Corporate Fraud Task Force, Practising Law Institute, 1492 PLl/CoRP
543, 552 (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd-yr_fraud_report.pdf at 1.2. From
the Task Force's inception through May of 2004, the DOJ charged over 900 defendants and over 60
corporate CEOs and presidents with some type of corporate fraud crime in connection with over 400
filed cases. [d. at 558. This was up from corporate fraud charges pending against 354 defendants in
connection with 169 filed cases in May of 2003. First Year Report to the President. Corporate
Fraud Task Force, Practising Law Institute, 1478 PLUCoRP 613, 626 (2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/first-yeacreport.pdfat 2.2.
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guidelines if indicted,3 deferred indictment, or no indictment at al1. 4 At
least since the 1999 publication of the Department of Justice's
(hereinafter "DOJ") charging policies for business organizations, 5
prosecutors have consistently considered a corporation's waiver of its
attorney-client privilege as an element of cooperation and regularly
request that corporations tum over documents - sometimes privileged
documents - that are relevant to the investigation. 6
The DOl's policy of treating waiver of the attorney-client privilege
as an element of cooperation (hereinafter "waiver policy," which is part
of the DOl's charging policy) is controversial and one of the most widely
discussed aspects of governmental efforts to investigate and prosecute
corporate crime. 7 Commentators and critics commonly make the
conclusory statement that the government coerces corporations into
waiving their attorney-client privileges. 8 In fact, in 2006, the National

3 In its 2006 annual report, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that II I of the 217
organizations had detailed culpability score information that either increased or decreased the fines
calculated at sentencing. Of the III cases, not one received a reduction in its culpability score for
having in place an effective compliance and ethics program, but eighty-seven (78.3%) organizations
received reductions for either self-reporting, cooperating, or accepting responsibility. Fifty-four
organizations (48.6%) received reductions for cooperating with the government investigation.
United
States
Sentencing
Comm'n
2006
Annual
Report,
at
41
(2006),
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/chap5_06.pdf.
4 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response,
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PLIICoRP 331, 333, 355-56 (2007).
5 Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy AU'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Bringing Criminal
Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), I White Collar Crime § 3:49 (2d ed.),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud!docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html.
6 Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel 1. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the
Federal Courts: A Proposal For a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 215-16
(2006).
7 Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 588 (2004) (U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan
addresses how privilege waivers impact the DOl's assessment of cooperation, and addresses
common criticisms of the DOJ policy, finding that the benefits of cooperation outweigh perceived
problems of waiver of the attorney-client privilege).
8 See. e.g., Adam Aldrich, Comment, In re Qwest Communications International: Does
Selective Waiver Exist for Materials Disclosed During a Government Investigation?, 84 DENV. U. L.
REv. 809, 826 (Sept. 2005-Sept. 2006) ("The SEC and DOJ are the ones coercing corporations to
waive [the privilege's] protections 'or else,' .... "); Jack King, NACDL, Chamber Of Commerce,
ACLU. ABA, Corporate Counsel Ally in Support of Attorney-Client Privilege, 29-DEC CHAMPION
8, 10 (2005) ("Section 8C2.5 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ... allows the government to
coerce an organization to waive attorney-client privilege to show "thorough" cooperation and thus
qualify for a reduced sentence."); Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client
Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv.
155, 156 (2006) ("[This article] concludes that selective waiver is inadequate in addressing the many
problems created by policies that coerce waiver and that a more desirable solution is to eliminate or
amend the governmental policies that coerce waiver."); Robert G. Morvillo, The Decline of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 12/2/97 N.Y. LJ. 3, col.l (1997) ("The office of the United States
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Association of Corporate Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") officially
declared in its Statement on Corporate Attorney Client Privilege that the
waiver policy necessarily coerces waivers of the attorney-client
privilege. 9 However, these statements are not supported by an analysis
of the waiver policy under the various legal standards for coerced
waivers.JO
A coerced waiver is involuntary and therefore invalid. II Thus, any
privileged information a corporation discloses to government
investigators pursuant to a coerced waiver would remain protected by the
privilege and would not be discoverable by plaintiffs in subsequent civil
actions. 12 Indeed, in 2007, several corporations successfully argued that
the government had coerced them into waiving their attorney-client
privileges by threatening indictment that, they alleged, would necessarily
lead to corporate death.13 The California Court of Appeal of the Fourth
Appellate District found that the risk of significant costs and
consequences associated with indictment coerced the corporations into

Attorney for the Southern District of New York routinely coerces corporate waivers of the privilege
by infonning corporate managers that their failure to waive the privilege will be evaluated in
detennining whether the corporation has been sufficiently cooperative to avoid indictment and/or a
severe guidelines sentence.").
9 NACDL Statement on Attorney-Client Privilege, National Association of Corporate
(2006),
available
at
Defense
Lawyers
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsflWhiteCollar/WCnews024/$FILE/Privilege_Statement06.pdf
("NACDL believes that in a climate created by the current practices of the Department of Justice, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the United States Sentencing Commission, and other
agencies, the waiver of privilege is necessarily coerced and therefore not a voluntary waiver. ").
10 There are various common-law tests courts use to detennine whether coercion has
occurred. Generally, the tests detennine whether the waiver resulted from a free and rational choice.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-76 (1981); 86 C.J.S. Threats § 32 (2007);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (200 I).
II A waiver must be given voluntarily. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986)
("Of course, a waiver must at a minimum be 'voluntary' to be effective against an accused.")
(citation omitted); CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a) (Westlaw 2008) (waiver occurs when "the holder of
the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has
consented to disclosure made by anyone") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
12 See In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th
Cir. 2002) ("As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege is waived by voluntary disclosure of
private communications by an individual or corporation to third parties. . .. The prevailing view is
that once a client waives the privilege to one party, the privilege is waived en toto.") (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1306
(E.D. Va. 1992) ("Moreover, voluntary disclosure by the client to a third party waives the privilege
as to both the specific communication and all other communications relating to the same subject
matter.") (emphasis added).
13 In re Natural Gas Anti-Trust Cases, JCCP 4221, 4224, 4226, 4428 San Diego Super. Ct.,
Tentative Ruling, Independent Plaintiff's McKesson Issue (June 12, 2007), available at
http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/pls/portalldocsIPAGE/SDCOURT/CIVILlJCCP/JCCPCASE2754IMfNU
TESORDERS/T AB 146924/MCKESSON-RULfNG%205-14-07.PDF.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

114

GOLDEN GATE UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

cooperating with the government. 14 As a result, the corporations
managed to protect documents they had disclosed to the government
from civil discovery.15
The difficult choice many corporations face - waive the attorneyclient privilege to avoid possible indictment and thereby make the
privileged materials available to third parties in civil suits, or assert the
privilege and thereby increase the risk of indictment - does not rise to the
level of coercion. As a general policy, coercion - like extortion and
duress - requires some wrongful threat or undue influence that causes a
victim's "choice" to be involuntary.16 Corporations face only the
"threat" of the reputational consequences that flow naturally from an
indictment, and these are the same type of consequences any criminal
defendant faces. 17 No matter how dire those consequences may be, they
are not wrongfully compelled by prosecutors.
To accept that the DOJ's charging policy is sufficient to coerce a
waiver, without any wrongful act by the DOJ, brings into question every
settlement or plea bargain made in which one party has a strong incentive
to avoid going to trial, such as risk of capital punishment or risk of a civil
award that could cause a defendant to go bankrupt. 18 Furthermore,
finding the DOJ's policy coercive may ultimately increase corporate
14 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186,188
(Ct. App. 2008).
15 !d. at 188-89. The court drew upon California law, which protects privileged information
from inadvertent disclosures, noting, "[TJhe holder of the privilege need only take 'reasonable steps'
to protect privileged communications. No case has required that the holder of a privilege take
extraordinary or heroic measures to preserve the confidentiality of such communications." fd.
However, a corporation does not choose to disclose privileged information when the disclosure is
inadvertent. Nor, as the court noted, does it choose to disclose privileged information when
compelled to do so by a court order. At issue in this case was a circumstance in which a corporation
consciously disclosed privileged information to government agents without legal compulsion to do
so. This circumstance requires an analysis distinct from situations in which an individual does not
actually consent to the disclosure. An absence of such analysis weakened the court's additional
reliance on two Ohio district court trade cases from the 1950's that opine that government requests
for information are implicitly coercive. See id. at 192. This is especially true in light of the Sixth
Circuit's position that a corporation cannot selectively waive the attorney-client privilege by
releasing otherwise privileged documents to government agencies during an investigation, and then
continue to assert privilege as to other parties. See In re ColumbialHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing
Practices Litig. 293 F.3d 289, 302-04 (2002).
16 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175-76 (1981); 86 C.J.S. Threats §
32 (2007); MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (2001).
17 See Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement oj Executives'
DeJense Costs, and the Federal Courts (part II), 7 U.c. DAVIS BuS. L.J. 2 (2006), available at
http://blj.ucdavis.eduJarticle.asp?id~650 ("Unless the Constitution is read to bar all indictments that
have adverse collateral impacts on defendants, the prospect of an indictment for a business
organization should have no greater significance under the Constitution than the indictment of any
other person or entity.").
18 See id.
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indictments. If the DO] cannot access enough infonnation to detennine
that a corporation has remediated any wrongdoing by its employees or
has fully complied with the law (e.g., through waiver of the attorneyclient privilege when there is a "legitimate need"),19 then it will be more
likely to indict the corporation. 20 Finally, a finding of coercion
ultimately allows corporations to selectively waive the privilege to
benefit from cooperating with the government, and then assert the
privilege as a shield against civil opponents. Such selective waivers go
against the public policy behind the privilege and have been rejected by
all but one federal circuit and a California court of appeal. 21 As long as
corporations knowingly and intelligently waive their attorney-client
privileges for purposes of obtaining a benefit from the government, the
mere threat of indictment without any wrongful act on the part of the
prosecutor or impennissible curtailment of a constitutional right does not
coerce the waiver.
Part I of this comment explains the attorney-client privilege and the
waiver doctrine and demonstrates the important role the privilege plays
in our legal system. It shows why, according to the DO] charging policy,
waiver of the privilege is often needed during corporate investigations. It
also addresses how the charging policy erodes the privilege in the
corporate context, thereby creating governance problems for

19 Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice,
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2003) at 8-9,
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
20 By fully cooperating, a corporation literally shows the government that it is a "good
corporate citizen" by fully disclosing any wrongdoing and taking steps to remediate. Without this
full disclosure the government cannot know if indictment is unnecessary. See Michael A. Simons,
Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Citizenship, " 76 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 979, 995 (2002) ("[PJrosecutors put such great weight on cooperation that it can often save a
corporation from indictment even if the corporation lacked a meaningful compliance program, even
if top management knew about the criminal activity, and even if top management was involved in
the criminal activity .... "). Full cooperation, however, is not a simple matter for management, and
will likely raise ethical concerns regarding the disclosure of information about employee
communications. See John Hasnas, Department of Coercion, WALL ST. J., Mar. II, 2006, at A9,
available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5974 ("For example, most corporations
solicit sensitive information from their employees by promising to keep communications ...
confidential. But whenever such communications suggest[] possible criminal activity within the
firm, the corporation must disclose it to the government or risk indictment and increased fines. The
responsible manager must then choose between protecting the corporation and reducing its promise
of confidentiality to a fraud.").
21 In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to adopt
selective waiver: "Our review of the opinions of other circuits, however, indicates there is almost
unanimous rejection of selective waiver. Only the Eighth Circuit has adopted selective waiver in
circumstances applicable to Qwesl."); see McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812,
821 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Given the Legislature's expressed desire to control evidentiary privileges and
protections, adoption of the selective waiver theory should come from that body.").
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corporations. Part II provides legal definitions and standards for coerced
waivers to show that the choice corporations must make between
waiving the privilege or increasing their risk of indictment does not meet
any legal test for coercion. Part III concludes that although the waiver
policy is problematic, it does not legally coerce corporations into
compliance.
I. BACKGROUND

The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized
privileges known to common law. 22 It dates back to ancient Rome 23 and
is one that our judicial system has carefully protected with only a few
specific exceptions. 24 In spite of its long history, the attorney-client
Like other
privilege does not have constitutional protection. 25
testimonial privileges, which keep truthful evidence from fact-finders,26
the attorney-client privilege is disfavored by courts, which apply it
narrowly and often resolve doubts in favor of disclosure. 27
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2006).
24 People v. Gurule, 51 P.2d 224, 250 (Cal. 2002); see Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v.
Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 505, 509 (W.O. Tenn. 1999) (,The attorney-client privilege
is a hallowed principle of Anglo-American law .... Nevertheless ... the privilege is not absolute,
and in some situations, society's interest in preventing ongoing illegal conduct outweighs its interest
in protecting confidential communications. ").
25 OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("[T]he attorney-client
privilege. .. is not a principle of constitutional proportions but a rule of evidence. While
unquestionably valued and significant, the attorney-client privilege has not been elevated to the
stature of a constitutional right.").
26 Testimonial privileges protect certain individuals from
being forced to disclose
confidential communications that occurred under specific circumstances. The purpose of testimonial
privileges is to promote relationships that society values, such as husband and wife (marital
privilege), doctor and patient (doctor-patient privilege), attorney and client (attorney-client
privilege), and clergy and penitent (penitent privilege). See I Federal Evidence § I :26 (3d ed.).
27 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("[Testimonial privileges] must be
strictly construed and accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.''') (citation omitted); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("[T]hese exceptions to the demand for everyman's evidence are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth."). Contra
United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir.1999) ("[W]here the attorney-client privilege is
concerned, hard cases should be resolved in favor of the privilege, not in favor of disclosure ....
'[A]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying
applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."') (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. at 393) (rejecting plaintiff's assertion that the fiduciary exception to the attorneyclient privilege should be read expansively to include any information relating to the fiduciary
relationship, even when the fiduciary seeks legal advice relating to personal liability arising from the
fiduciary relationship).
22
23
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The tension between the need for truth and the need for the privilege
has generated a heated debate over the DOJ's waiver policy. Those who
favor the policy note that investigations into corporate misconduct are
complex and government agencies have limited resources. 28 Thus, a
corporation's willingness to self-govern with sufficient transparency to
assure government agencies of its compliance with the law is a valuable
mechanism. It preserves government resources and at the same time
protects shareholders from the reputational costs associated with
indictment. 29
Critics of the waiver policy point to potential government
circumvention of employees' Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination; interference with corporate counsels' ability to effectively
guide corporate employees, officers, and directors toward compliance
with the law; and arguably, erosion of a privilege that has a long, strong
history in American jurisprudence. 30

A.

THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WAIVER DOCTRINE

Although its scope may vary, the attorney-client privilege is the
only communications privilege recognized by every state. 3l Generally,
the privilege protects confidential communications between client and
attorney made for the purpose of securing legal advice or
representation. 32
However, the privilege protects only the actual
communication between the client and the attorney, and not the
underlying facts or subject matter of that communication. 33
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage a
client's full and candid disclosure to his or her attorney so that the

28 See Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 167; see also Peter
Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs, and the
Federal Courts (Part 1),7 U.c. DAVIS BuS. L.1. 2 (2006).
29 See Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 155,167.
30 See, e.g., The Decline Of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Survey
Results, Presented to the United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission by
the Following Organizations: American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union,
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Roundtable, The
Financial Services Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, National Association of Manufacturers, National Defense Industrial Association, Retail
Industry Leaders Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington Legal Foundation,
http://www.acc.comlSurveys/attyclient2.pdf(last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
31 Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995).

32/d.
33

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,395 (1981).
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attorney may best represent the client and encourage compliance with the
law. 34
Likewise, corporate attorneys may have privileged
communications with employees for the purpose of handling legal issues
and guiding the corporation toward compliance, although they represent
the corporation and not its employees. 35 Despite its importance, courts
must apply the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it frustrates the
fundamental principle that the public has a right to all available
evidence. 36 Courts should ensure that the exclusion of relevant evidence
serves the purpose of the privilege and is for the greater public good. 37
The attorney-client privilege is not absolute. The holder of the
privilege must be able to establish that the communication sought to be
protected meets certain requirements. 38 If challenged, the holder of the
I d. at 389.
I d. at 392-93. However, as long as a lawyer conducting an investigation for the
corporation infonns employees that the lawyer represents the company, not the employee, the
employee has no legitimate expectation that the communication will remain confidential. Peter
Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs. and the
Federal Courts (Part II), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 2 n.180 (2006), available at
http://blj.ucdavis.eduJarticle.asp?id=650.
36 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) ("The very integrity of the
judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within
the framework of the rules of evidence .... [T]hese exceptions to the demand for every man's
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search
for truth.").
37 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) ("[Testimonial privileges] must be
strictly construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that pennitting a refusal to testify or
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the nonnally predominant principle of
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.").
38 X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Va. 1992) ('The party seeking to invoke
the privilege bears the burden of establishing that the attorney-client relationship existed, that the
particular communications at issue are privileged, and that the privilege has not been waived."). The
"classic test" applied in federal courts to detennine whether the privilege existed is as follows:
34

35

The privilege applies only if(1) the asserted holder ofthe privilege is or sought to be come a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was infonned (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d)
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.C. Mass. 1950). State courts
have similar requirements. See. e.g.. Tien v. Super. Ct., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 126-27 (Ct. App.
2006) (,"[Clonfidential communication between client and lawyer' means infonnation transmitted
between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means
which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the infonnation to no third persons other than those
who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the infonnation or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which the lawyer is consulted, and includes a legal opinion fonned and the advice given by the
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privilege must show that the communication does not fall into any
exceptions. 39 Furthermore, a party can waive the privilege expressly or
by implication through failure to assert the privilege in a proceeding, or
through disclosure of privileged information to a third party.40
The purpose of the waiver doctrine is to prevent selective disclosure
of privileged information that would allow the holder of the privilege to
disclose the information as a sword against an adversary, and
subsequently assert the privilege as a shield in a later proceeding. 41
Furthermore, once the holder of the privilege discloses confidential
information to a third party, the purpose and policy behind the attorneyclient privilege no longer apply because the information has ceased to be
confidentia1. 42 The waiver doctrine is in line with both the narrow scope
of the attorney-client privilege and the fundamental policy that the public
should have full knowledge of all relevant facts to best support a truthful
and fair result.
B.

GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIVE POLICIES: WAIVER AS AN ELEMENT
OF COOPERATION

The nature of a corporation makes criminal investigations difficult.
Prosecutors have trouble determining who the actors were, where the
lines of authority lead, and how to locate relevant records that may be
spread among a corporation's divisions. 43 As a result, government
lawyer in the course of that relationship.") (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (2003».
39 Although they will vary somewhat by jurisdiction, common exceptions to the attorneyclient privilege include (I) when the communication is to further a crime or fraud, (2) when an
attorney reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act that will result in
the death or great bodily injury of another, (3) when the client puts the communication at issue in a
proceeding, (4) when the lawyer is an attesting witness concerning a client's intention or competence
in executing the attested document, (5) when the intention or validity of a document executed by a
deceased client concerning property interests is at issue, and (6) when a communication between
joint clients is offered in evidence in subsequent civil litigation between them. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 956-62 (1967).
40 See X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. at 1306 n.15.
41 Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, Chapter 9. Protecting the
Confidentiality of Investigative Documents, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007); see Tennenbaum v.
Deloitte & Touche, 77 F.3d 337,340-41 (9th Cir. 1996).
42 Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 167 ("The
justification for granting the privilege 'ceases when the client does not appear to have been desirous
of secrecy.''') (citing Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981».
43 Id.; see also Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of
Executives'Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part I), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 2 (2006)
("White collar crime often involves complex financial transactions where the 'money trail' is
exceedingly difficult to trace. Moreover, the sophistication of the personnel involved makes
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agencies such as the DO] have placed high value on a corporation's
willingness and ability to effectively cooperate with investigations and to
proactively remediate any wrongdoing within the organization. 44 In
exchange for cooperation, the DO] may offer leniency in the form of
lesser charges, or no indictment at all. 45 Corporations find this offered
benefit difficult to turn down because they are under tremendous
pressure to avoid the reputational effects of indictment and the resulting
financial loss that innocent shareholders would likely suffer. 46
Therefore, it is argued, the DO] charging policy coerces the waivers and
ultimately erodes the attorney-client privilege by undermining its
purpose. 47

'smoking guns' rare. In addition, ... the participants in such conduct [are] dependant on one
another in a way that is difficult to disrupt.").
44 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response,
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PU/CORP 331, 333 (2007). The SEC has a similar program of
leniency in exchange for cooperation. On October 23,2001, the SEC released the Seaboard Report,
which outlined criteria it will consider when determining whether to bring an enforcement action
against a corporation. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, Securities Exchange Act, ReI. No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigationlinvestreportl34-44969.htm. First and foremost, the SEC considers
what will best protect investors, and because cooperation with law enforcement can help accomplish
that end, the Seaboard Report "set forth some of the criteria [the SEC] will consider in determining
whether, and how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation." Id.
Within these four broad categories, the Seaboard Report listed thirteen factors to consider. Id.
Among the factors is whether the company voluntarily discloses information that the SEC otherwise
might not have uncovered. Id. The Seaboard Report noted that companies may choose to waive the
attorney-client privilege out of "desire to provide information"; however, it "does not view a
company's waiver of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) to provide
relevant and sometimes critical information." Id.
45 Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response,
Practising Law Institute, 1617 PU/CoRP 331, 355-66, 362-63 (2007).
46 For example, financial-services firms like Arthur Andersen LLP rarely survive criminal
charges. See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 981 n.9 (2002) (citing Lynn Cowan & Cheryl Winokur
Munk, Anderson: Called to Account: Criminal Charges Threaten Auditor's Survival, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 18, 2002, at col. 15 ("In the past two decades, no financial-services firm has remained in
business after facing criminal charges.")). This is likely because such firms rely on their reputation
and customer trust, both of which may be lost when allegations of fraud are made public. On the eve
of its indictment (which followed massive shredding of documents in alleged obstruction of justice),
Arthur Andersen's lawyer argued that criminal charges meant '''[d]eath, death, death'" for the firm."
Id. (quoting Flynn McRoberts, Repeat Offender Gets StifJ Justice, CHI. TRlB., Sept. 4, 2002 at I,
available at 2002 WLNR 12598004).
47 See The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Survey Results,
Presented to the United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission by the
Following Organizations: American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union,
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Roundtable, The
Financial Services Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, National Association of Manufacturers, National Defense Industrial Association, Retail
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1. The Department ofJustice's Charging Guidelines in Corporate Fraud
Prosecutions
The DOJ publicly announced and later revised a set of principles
designed to guide federal prosecutors in the decision whether to
prosecute a business organization. 48 Generally, these principles require
U.S. Attorneys to consider the culpability of the corporation, any
remedial measures taken, and the corporation's willingness to cooperate
with government investigations. 49 To avoid indictment, a corporation
must convince prosecutors that prosecution will not serve the purposes of
criminal justice and will only harm innocent shareholders. so
The charging policy lists nine factors for prosecutors to consider
when deciding whether to charge a corporation. S1 These factors take into
Industry Leaders Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Washington Legal Foundation,
http://www.acc.comlSurveys/attyclient2.pdf(last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
48 The DOl's 1999 Holder Memorandum established the basic principles for charging
business entities and the DOJ's 2003 Thompson Memorandum incorporated these principles and
made them binding on prosecutors. Claudius O. Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment
and the Corporate Response, Practising Law Institute, 1617 P~/CORP 331, 349 (2007). The
Thompson Memorandum also emphasized the need to distinguish frue cooperation and refonnation
of the business entity from a corporation merely paying "lip service" to the government while
protecting or failing to revamp the practices that allowed the illegal behavior. Memorandum of
Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal
of
Business
Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003),
available
at
Prosecution
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~uidelines.htm.
The 2006 McNulty Memorandum
amended the charging policy to respond to criticisms about the inclusion of waiver of the attorneyclient privilege as an element of cooperation. Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen.,
United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2003)
at 8-9, http://www.usdoj.gov/daglspeeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
49 See Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Bringing
Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), I White Collar Crime § 3:49 (2d ed.),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html; Memorandum of Larry
D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution
of
Business
Organizations
(Jan.
20,
2003),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~iJidelines.htm; Memorandum of Paul 1. McNulty, Deputy
Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/daglspeeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
50 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 995 (2002); see Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations
at
Section
X
(Jan.
20,
2003),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~uidelines.htm.
51 These factors include the nature and seriousness of the offense, the pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the corporation, a history of similar conduct, the existence of an adequate
compliance program, whether the corporation has taken any remedial actions, whether prosecution
of the responsible individuals and/or civil and regulatory actions against the corporation will suffice,
the collateral adverse consequences of prosecution for innocent parties, and cooperation with
prosecutors. Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of
Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section II (Jan. 20, 2003),

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

122

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

account the nature of the corporate "person," including the extent of the
corporation's cooperation with prosecutors. 52 Cooperation comes in
many forms. Prosecutors expect corporations to admit to wrongdoing or
at least take responsibility for employees' wrongdoing, 53 and refrain
from impeding investigations. 54 Importantly, a corporation should act as
soon as it has knowledge of the misconduct. 55 Firing employees
involved in the illegal acts and the managers who were in charge of those
employees,56 as well as instituting structural, managerial, and policy
changes designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct, have also
helped corporations avoid indictment. 57 In other words, a corporation
must convince prosecutors that prosecution is unnecessary.58
Cooperation includes, if necessary, waiver of corporate attorneyclient privilege. 59 As of the 2006 amendments to the charging policy,

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate~uidelines.htm.
52 The Thompson Memorandum emphasized cooperation because
a corporation's
cooperation may be critical in identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence."
Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of Justice, Principles
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section IV (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
U

http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate~uidelines.htm.
53 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 1007 (2002) ("Most obviously, a corporation that denies
wrongdoing and resists a criminal investigation is far more likely to be indicted than a corporation
that cooperates with prosecutors. More particularly, a corporation's chances of avoiding indictment
are much greater if the cooperation admits its responsibility for the wrongdoing, terminates the
wrongdoers, rids itself of the top management in charge at the time of the wrongdoing, and waives
its privileges so that its cooperation can be free and unfettered.").
54 Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 593 (2004) (citing Thompson Memorandum).
55 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 999-1006 (2002) (e.g., to protect his investment in
Salomon Brothers, Warren Buffet acted within days; Daiwa was indicted after it waited almost two
months after it learned of misconduct to inform regulators).
56 1d. at 1007-08 ("[P]erhaps the most important [factor] in facilitating a corporation's full
cooperation is a change in top management. ... Indeed, without a change in top management, it can
be nearly impossible for a corporation to fully cooperate, because the top managers will essentially
be cooperating against themselves.").
57 Id. at 999 (describing the actions of Kidder Peabody & Company in response to exposure
of illegal trading schemes that took place within the company-within four months after the federal
investigation began, prosecutors announced that no criminal charges would be filed against Kidder).
58 As the Thompson Memorandum stated, "[t]he primary goals of criminal law are
deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. Non-criminal sanctions may not be an appropriate
response to an egregious violation, a pattern of wrongdoing, or a history of non-criminal sanctions
without proper remediation." Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United
States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section X
(Jan. 20,2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporatepidelines.htm.
59 See id. at Section II: Charging a Corporation: Factors to Be Considered. Waivers of the
attorney-client privilege "permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects,
and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements.
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prosecutors may request waivers only if they can demonstrate a
legitimate need to the U.S. Attorney Genera1. 60 If a corporation asserts
its privilege in the face of a waiver request, the DO] may not deem the
corporation uncooperative.
However, the DO] rewards voluntary
waivers with favorable consideration. 61
Though it may help a
corporation achieve cooperative status, waiver of the attorney-client
privilege is not a guarantee against indictment. 62 There may be
circumstances where corporate misconduct is so pervasive and serious
that no amount of cooperation will prevent indictment. 63
Additionally, they are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a
corporation's voluntary disclosure and cooperation." [d. at Section IV: Charging a Corporation:
Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure.
60 In response to extensive criticism of the inclusion of waiver of the attorney-client privilege
as an element of cooperation, the DOJ amended its charging guidelines in the 2006 McNulty
Memorandum. See Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., United States Dep't of
Justice,
Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations (2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. The revised guidelines "amplifIy] the
limited circumstances under which prosecutors may ask for waivers of privilege," emphasizing that
"legal advice, mental impressions and conclusions and legal determinations by counsel are
protected." Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the Lawyers for Civil
Justice Membership Conference Regarding the Department's Charging Guidelines in Corporate
Fraud
Prosecutions
(Dec.
12,
2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag...speech_06l2l2.htm (last visited Aug. 28,
2008). Now, a prosecutor must get approval directly from the Attorney General in writing before he
or she may request a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Id. To obtain approval, the prosecutor
must show a "legitimate need" for the information, i.e.,
(I) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit the
government's investigation; (2) whether the information sought can be obtained in a timely
and complete fashion by using alternative means that do not require waiver; (3) the
completeness of the voluntary disclosure already provided; and (4) the collateral
consequences to the corporation in requesting a waiver.

[d.
61

Id .

For example, Reliant Energy, one of the largest independent power producers in the
United States, was indicted in April 2004 in spite of the fact that it voluntarily disclosed information
to the DOJ. Reliant Energy Website, News Releases, Reliant Resources Asserts Subsidiary Violated
No
Laws,
Plans
Vigorous
Defense
(Apr.
8,
2004),
http://www.reliant.comlPublicLinkAction.do?i_chronicle_id=090 17 522800026fe&languagccode=e
n_US&ijull_format=jsp (click on link to "2004" then scroll down to link with article title)
("Moreover, any suggestion that Reliant did not fully cooperate with the Department of Justice
investigation is inaccurate and unfair. The company voluntarily disclosed the conduct, agreed to a
settlement with the FERC, assisted in making evidence available to the CFTC and Department of
Justice, and made a series of presentations to the Department of Justice concerning the facts and the
law. What Reliant did not do was agree that the conduct constitutes a criminal offense.").
63 As the Thompson Memorandum stated, "[t]he primary goals of criminal law are
deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. Non-criminal sanctions may not be an appropriate
response to an egregious violation, a pattern of wrongdoing, or a history of non-criminal sanctions
without proper remediation." Memorandum of Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., United
States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at Section X
62
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2. Criticism of the Waiver Policy
The American Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union,
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, legal scholars and
others have sharply criticized the inclusion of waiver of attorney-client
privilege as an element of cooperation. 64 Corporate executives and
attorneys contend that federal prosecutors, far from respecting the
privilege, routinely request waivers.65 To support this contention, the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Association
of Corporate Counsel conducted a survey that indicated that corporate
attorneys consider waiver requests the norm rather than the exception. 66
However, a government survey has shown the opposite. 67
One criticism is that the waiver policy erodes the attorney-client
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate~idelines.htm.
64 The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Survey Results,
Presented to the United States Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission by the
Following Organizations: American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union,
Association of Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Roundtable, The
Financial Services Roundtable, Frontiers of Freedom, National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, National Association of Manufacturers, National Defense Industrial Association, Retail
Industry Leaders Association, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Washington Legal Foundation, http://www.acc.comlSurveys/attyc1ient2.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2008); see also Stephanie A. Martz, The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007,
CHAMPION, May 2007 at 40.
65 Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate
Internal investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007)
("waiver has become a standard expectation of federal prosecutors and is not merely requested
'when necessary''').
66 NACDL
Statement
of
Attorney-Client
Privilege
(2006)
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsflWhiteCollarIWCnews024/$FILE/Privilege_Statement06.pdf;
see
also Marcia Coyle, New Legislation Would Bolster Attorney-Client Rights in Investigations,
NATIONAL
LAW
JOURNAL
(July
26,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/wcnews082?OpenDocument ("[A] new survey by the
Association of Corporate Counsel that found that more than 90 percent of 458 in-house counsel
responding believe that the attorney-client privilege in the context of government investigations is
either nonexistent or severely damaged. That is an increase from the organization's 2005 survey,
when 74 percent of respondents shared those sentiments.").
67 Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 588-98 (2004) ("In late 2002, at least partly in
response to these criticisms, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group conducted a survey to determine the
frequency of requests made by all ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' Offices for privilege waivers from
organizational defendants .... [T]he survey revealed that requests for waiver of the attorney-client
privilege ... were the exception rather than the rule: Waivers were requested in a very small number
of cases - four cases in the Southern District of New York, six cases in the District of Massachusetts,
six cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and two cases in the Eastern District of North
Carolina. The Northern District of Mississippi indicated that it has a practice of negotiating informal,
partial, unwritten waivers."); see also The U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Ad Hoc Advisory Group,
Report on The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines at 8 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/advgrprpt.htm.
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privilege, which in tum chills corporate counsel's ability to advise and
represent the corporation because employees will withhold infonnation
out of fear of exposure. 68 According to critics, employee fears are well
founded because these waivers allow the government to circumvent
employees' privileges against self-incrimination.
The government
encourages employers to pressure their employees to make potentially
self-incriminating statements as part of an internal investigation, and
these unprotected statements69 are subsequently disclosed to the
government when the corporation waives its attorney-client privilege. 7o
Furthennore, government investigation frequently results in thirdparty civil suitS. 71 Civil plaintiffs may demand access to privileged
infonnation that a corporation disclosed to government prosecutors, on
the grounds that the disclosure waived the privilege. In these situations,
courts often grant plaintiffs' requests. 72 The likelihood of exposure in
subsequent civil suits forces a corporation facing indictment to weigh the
associated reputational costs of criminal charges against the potential
cost of allowing civil plaintiffs access to privileged infonnation.
Although the 2006 amendments to the DOJ's charging policy
sought to address these concerns, critics believe that the revised
guidelines still fail to adequately protect the privilege. 73 Because the

68 See, e.g., Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and
Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. ISS, 180-186
(2006); Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007).
69 As long as a lawyer conducting an investigation for the corporation informs the employee
that the lawyer represents the company, not the employee, the employee has no legitimate
expectation that the communication will remain confidential. Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard:
Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts (part II), 7
U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 2 n.180 (2006), available at http://blj.ucdavis.eduJarticle.asp?id=650.
70 See, e.g., Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the
Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 595-96 (2004); Colin P. Marks,
Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth
Having at All?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 155, 173-74 (2006) ("[S]uch waivers permit the government
to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate
individual cooperation or immunity agreements .... ") (citing the Thompson Memorandum).
71 Louis M. Brown, Anne o. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007)
("Fifteen percent of companies that experienced a governmental investigation within the past five
years indicated that the investigation generated related third-party civil suits (such as private antitrust
suits or derivative securities law suits).").
72 For a comprehensive discussion of selective waiver and its treatment by federal courts, see
In re ColumbiaIHCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 295-314 (6th Cir.
2002).
73 Louis M. Brown, Anne O. Kandel, & Richard S. Gruner, The Legal Audit: Corporate
Internal Investigation Current Through the August 2007 Update, LEGAL AUDIT § 9:39 (2007) ("By
allowing privilege waiver requests under some circumstances and by providing large rewards for
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reward for voluntary waiver - favorable consideration and a reduced risk
of indictment - is so tempting, few corporations will resist. 74 As
corporations continue to waive their privileges, guarantees of
confidentiality become meaningless, thereby undermining the purpose of
the privilege. 75 The growing movement against the waiver policy has
been reflected in proposed legislative measures. For example, an early
version of proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502 would have expressly
allowed selective waiver; i.e., disclosure of privileged documents to the
government for purposes of government investigation would not
constitute a waiver; 76 that provision, however, was omitted from Rule
502 as enacted. 77 The proposed Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act
of 2007 would prevent government agents from demanding waiver of the
privilege under any circumstances and preclude favorable consideration
of voluntary waivers. 78
Until, if ever, the proposed legislation becomes law, the question
remains: does the government policy of considering waiver of the
attorney-client privilege as an element of cooperation rise to the level of
coercion? If it does, corporations can save themselves from exposure in
subsequent civil suits if they choose to disclose privileged information.
Or, they can fight their indictments on the grounds that the government's
evidence was gained through illegal coercion.
However, as
demonstrated below, as long as a corporation knowingly and intelligently
waives its attorney-client privileges for purposes of obtaining a benefit
from the government, the mere threat of indictment without any
wrongful act on the part of the prosecutor or impermissible curtailment
of a constitutional right does not coerce the waiver.

voluntary privilege waivers, the standards in the McNulty Memorandum will still undercut the
confidentiality guarantees that are necessary for the attorney-client privilege ... to serve [its]
important purpose in promoting corporate self-evaluations and legal advice.").

Id .
Id .
76 Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the
Federal Courts: A Proposal For a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REv. 211, 250-51
(2006); see Committee on Rules and Practices of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, May 15,2006 (revised June 30, 2006), FED.
R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ruleslReports/EV052006.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
77 See FED. R. EVID. 502 (Pub. L. No. 110-322, § I(a), 122 Stat. 3537 (2008».
78 The Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2007 passed through the House of Representatives on
November 13, 2007. House of Representatives Proceedings and Debates of the I 10th Congress, The
Attorney-Client Privilege Act of2007, 153 Congo Rec. HI3562-01, 2007 WL 3355182 (Cong. Rec.)
(Nov. 13,2007); see Stephanie A. Martz, The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007,31May CHAMPION 40 (2007). The status of the bill can be tracked online at GovTrackUS,
http://www.govtrack.us/congresslbill.xpd?bil1=hII0-3013.
74
75
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR COERCION
Like corporations, individual criminal defendants often face hard
choices. For example, every plea bargain entered into by a criminal
defendant requires waiver of constitutional privileges and rights to avoid
risk of a more severe punishment. 79 Though these decisions may be
difficult, they are not legally the result of coercion. What corporations
face today are merely the accepted norms of our criminal justice system,
which have always applied to natural persons accused of crimes. 80
A.

COERCION REQUIRES A WRONGFUL ACT

The only clear definition of coerced waiver of the attorney-client
privilege arises in one context: disclosure erroneously compelled by
court order. 8l For example, California Evidence Code section 919(b)
provides that if a person asserts the attorney-client privilege in a
proceeding,82 but is erroneously compelled by an order of the presiding
officer to disclose the privileged information, the disclosure has been
coerced. 83
Under this definition of coercion, the DOJ's waiver policy could
only coerce a waiver when (1) the prosecutor issued a subpoena
demanding disclosure of privileged information; (2) the corporation
asserted the attorney-client privilege and refused to produce the
documents; and (3) the court erroneously found that the information was
not privileged and compelled disclosure. However, usually both the
corporation and the prosecutor agree that the information is privileged,

79
80

U.S. v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196,209-10 (1995).
See id.

81 See UNIF. R. EVID. 510(b) ("Involuntary disclosure. A claim of privilege is not waived by
a disclosure that was compelled erroneously or made without the opportunity to claim the
privilege."); CAL. EVID. CODE § 919(b) ("If a person authorized to claim the [attorney-client]
privilege claimed it, whether in the same or a prior proceeding, but nevertheless disclosure
erroneously was required by the presiding officer to be made, neither the failure to refuse to disclose
nor the failure to seek review of the order of the presiding officer requiring disclosure indicates
consent to the disclosure or constitutes a waiver and, under these circumstances, the disclosure is one
made under coercion.").
82 Government investigations constitute proceedings because a court can issue a subpoena to
compel disclosure of information for purposes of the investigation. See 2 B.E.WITKlN, CALIFORNIA
EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 65, at 316 (4th ed. 2000) ("If confidentiality is to be protected effectively by
a privilege, the privilege must be recognized in proceedings other than judicial proceedings. The
protection afforded by a privilege would be insufficient if a court were the only place where the
privilege could be invoked. Every officer with power to issue subpoenas for investigative purposes,
every administrative agency, every local governing board, and many more persons could pry into the
protected information if the privilege rules were applicable only in judicial proceedings.").
83 CAL. EVID. CODE § 919(b).
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and the corporation does not assert its privilege in court. Thus, the issue
of being erroneously compelled to disclose privileged information does
not arise.
Common-law definitions of coercion strongly suggest that without
some improper act on the part of the prosecutor, a corporation's waiver
of its attorney-client privilege is not coerced. For example, the Model
Penal Code defines criminal coercion as making certain untruthful or
unjustified threats "with the purpose of unlawfully restricting another's
freedom of action to his detriment.,,84 Thus, criminal coercion requires a
wrongful act (the unjustified threat) and a wrongful purpose (unlawfully
restricting another's freedom).
Under tort law, a plaintiff must meet three requirements to recover
damages for coercion. First, there must be some wrongful or unlawful
act or conduct on the part of the defendant; second, that wrongful or
unlawful act must be sufficient to prevent the plaintiff from exercising
his or her free will; and third, the plaintiff must suffer harm as a result. 85
Furthermore, and relevant to the assertion that the threat of indictment
coerces waivers of the attorney-client privilege, "mere threats of criminal
prosecution will not sustain a tortious coercion claim.,,86
Similarly, in contract law, a victim may void a contract if his or her
consent to the contract was induced by improper threats that leave the
victim with no reasonable alternative. 87 A threat of criminal prosecution
is improper when the threat involves a misuse of power for personal
84 Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 537 U.S. 393, 40S n.13 (2003) (citing MODEL PENAL
CODE § 212.5, cmt. 2, at 264). The Model Penal Code states:

(I) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to
restrict another's freedom of action to his detriment, he threatens to:
(a) commit any criminal offense; or
(b) accuse anyone of a criminal offense; or
(c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to
impair his credit or business repute; or
(d) take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) that the actor
believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that
his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the
circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action,
as by desisting from further misbehavior, making good a wrong done, refraining from taking
any action or responsibility for which the actor believes the other disqualified.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5.
85 86 C.l.S. Threats § 32 (2007); see, e.g., Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d lIS, 123 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959) ("it is not actionable coercion or duress to threaten to do what one has a legal right to do")
(citations omitted).
86 86 C.l.S. Threats § 32 (2007).
87 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (\981) (explaining when duress by threat
makes a contract voidable).
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gain. 88 However, a good-faith explanation of the criminal consequences
of another's conduct may not be a threat at all. Generally, a threat to do
that which one has the legal right to do will not be found coercive unless
the right is abused or the threat is made in bad faith.89 Under the
defmitions of coercion, it appears that the DOJ's waiver policy alone,
without specific wrongful acts by prosecutors, could not legally coerce a
corporation's waivers. The analysis of coercion claims in case law, as
discussed below, reinforces this finding.

B.

ANALYSIS UNDER EXISTING LEGAL STANDARDS FOR A FINDING OF
COERCED WAIVER IN CASE LAW

Consistent with general common-law concepts of coercion, case law
addressing the voluntariness of waivers focuses on government actions to
determine whether coercion has occurred. The Supreme Court has
analyzed claims of coerced waivers in at least three contexts: (1) waiver
of Miranda rights 90 during government interrogation, (2) waiver of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the face of a
government threat of job loss, and (3) waivers of constitutional rights and
privileges in the context of plea bargaining. Constitutional rights
generally enjoy greater protection from the courts than do common-law
privileges. 91 Thus, it is fair to say that constitutional protections create a
baseline threshold for coercion; i.e., without specific statutory language
to the contrary, non-constitutional privileges such as the attorney-client

88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176, cm!. c (1981). Other improper threats
include a threatened crime or tort, bad faith threat of civil proceedings, threatened breach of an
existing contract, threatened use of power for illegitimate ends, threat strengthened by prior unfair
dealings, and when the threatened act would hann the victim and not benefit the party making the
threat (i.e., indicates vindictiveness). /d., cmt. f.
89 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 71 :26 (4th ed. West 2007).
90 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court established that
prosecutors cannot use statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation unless certain
procedural safeguards are in place to protect the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Namely, before being questioned, a person must be warned "that he has right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
the right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed." /d. at 444. A defendant may waive the
right to counsel and to remain silent, "provided that waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently." /d.
91 Constitutional rights are a part of the supreme law of the land which can only be changed
through an amendment to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. I, 18 (1958) ("[T]he United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land, it is binding to
all states such that states cannot make laws that conflict with the Constitution, and every state
legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath to support the
Constitution."). Statutory and common-law privileges, however, can be given or taken away by the
legislature.
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privilege will not require a test more stringent than one used to protect
privileges of constitutional dimensions.92 Under the legal standards for
coercion established by the Supreme Court, in the absence of wrongful
government conduct, corporations that knowingly and intelligently waive
their attorney-client privilege in exchange for the benefit of reduced risk
of indictment do so voluntarily.
1. The Legal Standard for Coerced Miranda Waivers

The Supreme Court has held that to determine whether a defendant
voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights, a court must consider two
factors. First, it must consider whether the waiver was the product of a
free and deliberate choice, and second, it must consider whether the
defendant was fully aware of the nature of the right and the consequences
of waiving it. 93 A court reviews these factors in light of the totality of
the circumstances. 94
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach requires consideration
of "the defendant's age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and whether the defendant has the capacity to understand
the Miranda warnings, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the
consequences of waiving those rights.,,95 And, consistent with cornrnonlaw definitions of coercion, some wrongful government activity must
have occurred. 96 The requirement of wrongful government conduct
comports with the rationale for excluding evidence obtained through
coerced waivers of rights and privileges, specifically, that information
acquired through coercion is not trustworthy and the methods used to
92 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. Z18, 237 (1973) ("Almost without exception, the
requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair triaL"); see also OKC
Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege ... is
not a principle of constitutional proportions but a rule of evidence. While unquestionably valued and
significant, the attorney-client privilege has not been elevated to the stature of a constitutional
right.").
93 People v. Whitson, 949 P.Zd 18,28 (Cal. 1998) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 41Z,
422-23 (1986».
94

95

1d.
1d.

96 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) ("coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' .... "); id. at 170 ("The
voluntariness of a waiver of [the privilege against self-incrimination] has always depended on the
absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice' in any broader sense of the word."); see also
People v. Jablonski, IZ6 P.3d 938, 965 (Cal. 2006) ("Voluntariness does not tum on anyone fact, no
matter how apparently significant, but rather on the 'totality of [the] circumstances.' ... 'Coercive
police activity is a necessary predicate ... .' Additionally, 'such activity must be, as it were, the
'proximate cause' of the statement in question, and not merely a cause in fact."') (citations omitted).
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obtain it are unjust. 97
Without improper acts by prosecutors, a corporation's subjective
fear of the consequences of indictment cannot legally coerce a waiver.
Even if prosecutors behave improperly, the totality of the circumstances
weighs against coercion. Corporations facing indictment comprise
successful, educated, experienced parties who employ sophisticated
counsel to advise them as to their rights and privileges and the
consequences of any waivers.98 The sophistication of the parties and the
presence of competent counsel will likely counteract any undue influence
exerted by prosecutors. 99
Fear of the collateral consequences of
indictment may create a strong incentive for corporations to do whatever
is necessary to avoid indictment, but corporations will have to point to
something more compelling to meet the totality-of-the-circumstances
legal standard for coercion.

2. The Legal Standard for Coercion Under Garrity
The Supreme Court has held that threat of job loss was sufficient to
coerce statements that otherwise would have been protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination. loo In Garrity v. New Jersey, 101
during an investigation of alleged fixing of traffic tickets, the New Jersey
Attorney General questioned several police officers. 102 Before being
questioned, each officer was warned that he could invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer,
but that if he did so, he could be fired pursuant to a state statute that
required complete candor of its officers. 103 The officers answered all
97 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) ("[T]he methods used to extract
[involuntary confessions] offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that
ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system - a system in which the State must establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured .... ").
98 Any reasonable corporate counsel should be aware that waiver to a government third party
will likely constitute waiver for subsequent proceedings. As discussed, California and all but one
federal circuit have ruled against selective waivers. Furthermore, the participation of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Association of Corporate Counsel in the campaign
against the DOJ's charging policy, as well as the extensive literature discussing the issue, create a
fair assumption that corporate counsel are aware of the issue.
99 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("Defendants advised by competent
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice
in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.")
(citation omitted).
100 Lisa K. Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 311,353 (2007).
101 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
102 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. at 494.
103 [d.
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questions. 104 Prosecutors subsequently used the officers' responses to
prosecute them for conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic
laws. 105 The officers appealed their convictions on the ground that their
statements had been coerced. 106
The test for coercion was "whether the accused was deprived of his
free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.,,107 The Court
analogized the loss of a government job to forfeiture of property
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and held that the threat of
losing one's livelihood could prevent a person from making a free and
rational choice to invoke the constitutional right not to selfincriminate. lOS Key to the Court's decision was the constitutional stature
of the protections that had been compromised by the state statute. 109
A corporation could argue that an indictment will effectively
destroy the corporation, which is equivalent to a threat of job loss, which
in tum is a sufficiently severe sanction to coerce a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege. llo However, this analogy is flawed. A corporation's
waiver of the attorney-client privilege to avoid indictment does not meet
the Garrity standard of coercion for two reasons.
First, the Garrity analogy fails because a corporation's decision to
disclose privileged information to government agents does not require
the corporation to choose between two constitutional rights. Unlike the
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the attorney-client
privilege is statutory. Furthermore, a corporation does not have a
constitutional right to a continued "means of livelihood" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although a corporation qualifies as a "person"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and enjoys the protection of
its property rights through due process requirements, III the Supreme
Id.
1d.
106 1d. at 495.
107 1d. at 496 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
108 Id. at 497 (being faced with the "option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the
penalty of self-incrimination ... is 'likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him
from making a free and rational choice."') (citation omitted).
109 Id. at 500 ("There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not
condition by the exaction of a price.").
110 Corporations have argued that indictment equals corporate death. See. e.g., Michael A.
Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Citizenship," 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 979, 981 n.9 (2002) (On the eve of its indictment (which followed massive
shredding of documents in alleged obstruction of justice), "Arthur Andersen's lawyer argued that
criminal charges meant '[dJeath, death, death' for the firm") (citing Flynn McRoberts, Repeat
Offender Gets StiffJustice, CHI. TRIB. at I, Sept. 4, 2002).
1119 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations § I, at 775 (10th ed. 2005)
("the corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
104

105
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Court has circumscribed corporate constitutional protections.
For
example, the Privileges and Immunities protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to natural persons, not corporations. 112 Neither
can corporations claim the right to Liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 113 Finally, some "purely personal" protections, such as the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, have historically been
reserved for natural persons due to the nature or purpose of the privilege
and therefore do not apply to corporations. 114
Though a corporation does have a constitutional right to its
property, its continued "means of livelihood" does not have
constitutional protection but is contingent upon the corporation's
compliance with the state laws that created it. lIs For example, a
corporation can be suspended and involuntarily dissolved for mere
failure to file the proper documents with the secretary of state. 116 A
suspended corporation loses its rights, powers, and privileges, is disabled
from using courts for any purpose (except to apply for reinstatement),
and loses the right to retain its corporate name.117 A dissolved
corporation, once its affairs have been wound up, simply ceases to

of the federal Constitution and similar provisions of the California Constitution").
112 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
113 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978) (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925)).
114 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.l4 ("Certain 'purely personal'
guarantees ... are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 'historic function'
of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals .... Whether or not a
particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason
depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.") (citing
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944)); see Jed S. Rakoff, Coerced Waiver of
Corporate Privilege, 7/13/95 N.V. LJ. 3 at col.l (July 13, 1995) ("The fundamental reason why a
company is entitled to the protections of the attorney-client privilege but not to those of the privilege
against self-incrimination is that 'the [attorney-client] privilege does not exist out of deference to any
personal right, but rather ... to facilitate the workings of justice. "') (citing Radiant Burners Inc. v.
Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1963)).
115 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) ("A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it,
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence") (citing Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,636 (1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116 See 16A Fletcher Cyclopedia Corp. § 7997 (2007) ("[A]II jurisdictions require
corporations to file either annual or biennial reports. Most states also require the annual payment of
franchise taxes or license fees. If a corporation fails to comply with these requirements for a
specified period of time after they become due, the state usually has authority to administratively
suspend its activities and to dissolve the corporation without obtaining a judicial order. This is
known as administrative dissolution ...."); see, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 2205.
117 See, e.g., 9 B.E.WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations § 75, at 845 (10th
ed.2005).
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exist. 118 In other words, corporations do not enjoy a constitutional right
to their continued existence or means of livelihood; thus, the Garrity
analysis does not apply.
Second, the Garrity analogy fails because unlike the officers in
Garrity, corporations exchange their waivers for a specific benefit:
reduced risk of indictment. In Garrity, the officers had a choice between
the status quo of job retention and the penalty of job loss. The officers
did not gain any advantage by waiving their privileges against selfincrimination; they merely avoided being forced into a worse position.
On the other hand, the status quo for a corporation being investigated by
the government is a risk of indictment. Corporations waive their
attorney-client privilege in exchange for a reduction of that risk, thereby
moving themselves into a better position. Furthermore, the penalties in
Garrity were statutorily compelled and certain to occur, whereas an
indictment does not legally compel the dissolution of a corporation. 119
Though the reputational consequences of an indictment may affect a
corporation's value, indictment will not necessarily result in the financial
destruction of the company.120
For example, Reliant Energy was indicted in 2004 for alleged pricefixing during the 2001 California energy crisis. Since its indictment,
Reliant Energy's stock has continued to rise steadily from approximately
$5 a share in 2004 to around $25 a share in 2007. 121 However, Reliant
experienced a significant drop in stock value from 2001 when the first

118 Although it is true that corporate employees may lose their jobs if a corporation dissolves,
their rights are not at issue here, as they are not holders of the attorney-client privilege, nor are they
being directly "threatened" by the DOJ. This does however, bring up the issue of "delegated
coercion"; i.e., to cooperate, the corporation does an internal investigation, legally requiring its
employees to respond to its questions on pain of job loss; the corporation then turns over employee
statements to the government. The argument is that "when corporations themselves are compelling
employee statements, but doing so at the behest of the government, the government's wrongful
threat is delegated." Lisa K. Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311, 358-65 (2007). The solution for this problem may be "for
corporations and the government to recognize employees' rights during the corporate investigatory
phase ... and to have counsel present during their interviews by corporation counsel." Marvin G.
Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in Tough Spot, Are 'Cooperating'
Corporations Violating Constitutional Rights?, 236 N.Y.L.J. 10 (Col. 4) (July 24,2006).
119 Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement oj Executives' DeJense
Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part If), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.1. 2 (2006), available at
http://blj.ucdavis.edularticle.asp?id=650.
120

1d.

121 See NASDAQ Stock Market Charts for Reliant Energy (RRI) with 10-year time frame,
http://quotes.nasdaq.comlquote.dll?page=charting&mode=basics&intraday=off&timeframe= I Oy&ch
arttype=ohlc&splits=off&earnings=off&movingaverage=None&lowerstudy=volume&comparison=
off&index=&drilldown=off&symbol=RRI&selected=RRI (last visited March 4, 2008).
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allegations of wrongdoing were made public,122 and its stock continued
to drop until 2003 when the company reached settlements with the
investigating agencies. 123 This kind of result apparently is quite
common. Empirical studies show significant declines in reported
earnings occur in the year of the announced allegation of misconduct. 124
On average, firms lose forty-one percent of their market value when
news of the misconduct is revealed. 125 Damage to the share value of the
company is done long before indictment: the first publicly announced
allegations of illegal activities do the most harm to the company's
reputation and value.
An indictment will, however, adversely affect the charged party. At
the very least, any accused is likely to suffer reputational damage and the
financial costs of defense. However, "the distinction between economic
harm that is foreseeable in the marketplace and harm that is legally
required by the state" places the waiver of the attorney-client privilege
issue outside of the Garrity rule. 126
122 See James F. Peltz, Power Suppliers' Stocks Fall Under Strain of Public Attack, Wall
Street: Analysts are split on whether lower prices make for a good opportunity to buy shares now,
Los ANGELES TIMES, June 14,2001, available at 2001 WLNR 10567770 ("The [power] companies'
stocks are taking a beating lately from public allegations that these unregulated electricity and
natural-gas providers are unfairly exploiting California's power crisis for their bottom lines.").
123 1d.
The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) were investigating Reliant Energy prior to its indictment by the DOJ. See
Reliant Resources Inc.: SEC issues investigation order regarding 'round trip' trades, WALL ST. J.
(U.S. Edition), June 21, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 3280917; To move beyond Western
investigations, Reliant settles, INSIDE FERC, Oct. 6,2003, available at 2003 WLNR 3216953.
124 Deborah Murphy, Ronald E. Shrieves, and Samuel L. Tibbs, Understanding the Penalties
Associated With Corporate Misconduct: An Empirical Examination of Earnings and Risk, JOURNAL
OF
FINANCIAL
AND
QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS,
manuscript
at
2-3,
http://www.corpgovcenter.org/ResearchiDetShrMurTib.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2008).
125 1d. at 4. For example, McKesson HBOC lost $9 billion in shareholder value when its
accounting fraud scheme was disclosed. Second Year Report to the President, Corporate Fraud Task
Force at 3.8 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfl2ndJr3raud_report.pdf. Mercury Finance
Company was not indicted; however, its Treasurer was charged with wire fraud and bank fraud in
connection with a scheme to fraudulently inflate income and receivables while underreporting loan
delinquencies. When the fraud was discovered, the company's stock value dropped from around
fifteen dollars per share to approximately two dollars per share, representing a market capitalization
loss of over $2 billion. Id. at 3.10. Dynegy's former Senior Director of Tax Planning/International
Tax and Vice President of Finance was sentenced to more than twenty-four years for his role in a
corporate fraud scheme. When the fraud was publicly disclosed, Dynegy's stock fell fifty-two
percent in two days. Id. at 3.14. The former chairman and vice-chairman of Cendant Corp. were
found guilty of conspiracy and securities fraud arising out of an accounting fraud scheme. When the
fraud was made public, Cendant suffered a market capitalization loss of $14 billion in one day.
Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Marks Five years of
Ensuring
Corporate
Integrity
(July
17,
2007),
available
at

http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2007/July/07_odag...507.html.
126 Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives' Defense
Costs, and the Federal Courts (Part /I), 7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 2 (2006), available at
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3. The Legal Standard for Coerced Plea Bargains

The cooperation required by the DOJ to avoid indictment follows
the long common-law history of rewarding a witness who is an accessory
to a crime with leniency in exchange for giving information against
another defendant. 127 A corporation can be held vicariously liable for the
actions of its directors, officers, and employees if they were acting within
the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the corporation. 128
In exchange for cooperation, including, if necessary, disclosing
privileged information the corporation has regarding the criminal acts of
its employees, the DOJ may offer the corporation leniency in the form of
no indictment. Whether viewed as an offer of leniency or its natural
inverse - a threat of indictment - this type of exchange has become
integral to our criminal justice system and does not constitute
. 129
coercIOn.
For example, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court
validated a prosecutor's threat to pursue more severe charges if the
defendant did not accept a plea agreement. The Court reasoned that the
prosecutor "no more than openly presented the defendant with the
unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he
was plainly subject to prosecution.,,130 Similarly, in Brady v. United

http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article.asp?id=650.
127 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship, " 76 Sr. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 979 (2002) ("Judicial leniency for cooperators traces its
roots back hundreds of years to the common law practice of approvement, and American prosecutors
have been striking deals with cooperators since at least the nineteenth century."); see United States
v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826
F.2d 310,315 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Juncal, 1998 WL 525800 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
("The concept of affording cooperating accomplices with leniency dates back to the common law in
England and has been recognized and approved by the United States Congress, the United States
Courts and the United States Sentencing Commission.").
128 See, e.g., Stephanie A. Martz, The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, 31May CHAMPION 40 (2007) ("Since the Supreme Court's 1909 decision in New York Central &
Hudson R,R, v, United States, [212 U.s, 481 (1909),) corporations have been vicariously liable for
the actions of their employees."); Memorandum of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., United
States Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (2003) at 13,
cmt, B, http://www,usdoj,gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo,pdf (citing United States v, Basic
Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir, 1983) ("[A) corporation may be held criminally responsible for
antitrust violations committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their
authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, even if, , , such acts were
against corporate policy or express instructions."».
129 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U,S, 357, 364 (1978) ("Defendants advised by competent
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice
in response to prosecutorial persuasion, , ,."); Santobello v, New York, 404 U,S, 257, 260-61
(1971 ),
130 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 365,
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States, the Court rejected petitioner's assertion that his plea bargain had
been coerced by the threat of capital punishment, by the prosecutor's
offer of leniency, and by pressure from his attorney to accept the plea. 131
The Court held that as long as petitioner pleaded guilty with full
knowledge of the direct consequences of his plea, the plea was voluntary
unless it was induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper
promises. 132
Corporate waiver of the privilege to avoid the risk of serious costs
and consequences associated with indictment can be analogized to plea
bargains made by criminal defendants to avoid the risk of a capital
sentence. 133
Through plea bargains, criminal defendants waive
constitutional rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the
right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one's accusers in exchange
for a lesser charge or punishment. 134 A plea of guilty is itself a
conviction, it is conclusive, and "the court has nothing to do but give
judgment and sentence.,,135
In spite of the significant sacrifice an accused makes in a plea
bargain, the Supreme Court acknowledges that this aspect of the criminal
justice system is entirely acceptable, and "an essential component of the
administration of justice.,,136 The Court embraces plea bargaining
because it helps both defendants and prosecutors by allowing each to
avoid the expense and risks of trial. 137 As in Garrity, a prosecutor cannot
131

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970).

132

/d. at 755 ("(A) plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,

including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are
by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes).").
I33 See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 981 n.9 (2002) (citing Lynn Cowan & Cheryl Winokur
Munk, Anderson: Called to Account: Criminal Charges Threaten Auditor's Survival, WALL ST. 1.,
MAR. 18, 2002, at col. 15 ("In the past two decades, no financial-services firm has remained in
business after facing criminal charges."».
134 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748.
m Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (citing Kercheval v. United States,
274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927».
136 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). For example, in 2006, 95.7% of
successfully prosecuted criminal cases resulted from a guilty plea while only 4.3% had gone to trial.
2006
Annual
Report
at
34
(2006),
United
States
Sentencing
Comm'n
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPTI2006/chap5_06.pdf.
137 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 752 (1970»; see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 260 ("If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by
many times the number of judges and court facilities."); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
(1977) ("The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration ... gains a speedy disposition of his
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vindictively punish a defendant for asserting a right such as his right to
trial,138 but a prosecutor can offer the benefit of leniency in exchange for
cooperation because "in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is
no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is
free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.,,139 Furthennore, courts
presume that a defendant anned with advice from competent counsel and
procedural protections can make an intelligent decision in the face of
prosecutorial persuasion. 140
The same principles can be applied in the corporate context.
Corporations and prosecutors both benefit from the exchange of
cooperation for leniency. Prosecutors receive valuable infonnation that
helps them conserve resources, and corporations can avoid the
reputational costs and uncertain results of an indictment. Like a criminal
defendant who chooses to go to trial rather than accept a plea bargain, a
corporation can refuse to waive its attorney-client privilege and take the
chance that it may be indicted. The corporation is free to accept or reject
the government's offer of leniency in exchange for cooperation. In other
words, the offer does not coerce cooperation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Trammel v. United States supports
this analogy. 141 In Trammel, a wife chose to waive her testimonial
marital privilege and testify against her husband in exchange for a grant
of immunity and assurances of leniency. The Court held that these
proffered benefits did not render her testimony involuntary. 142 Similarly,
although the coercion issue has not been considered specifically, lower
federal courts have shown little sympathy for the tough decision
corporations may be faced with when under investigation by the DOJ,
case, ... and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by
those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings. ").
138 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363 ("To punish a person because he has done what
the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, ... and for an
agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on
his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional. "') (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33
n.20 (1973».
139 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363; see id. at 364 ("[T]he imposition of these
difficult choices [is] an inevitable - and permissible - attribute of any legitimate system which
tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas."); see also United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d
330, 363 (S.D. N.Y. 2006) ("No one disputes the proposition that a willingness to cooperate with the
government is an appropriate consideration in deciding whether to charge an entity."); 22 C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 487 ("[T]he promise of a recommendation of a lenient sentence and the consequent
fear ofa greater penalty upon conviction after trial does not render the plea involuntary.").
140 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 758.
141 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
142 [d. at 53.
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finding it an insufficient reason to create an exception to the waiver
doctrine. 143
This is not to say that waivers of rights and privileges can never be
coerced. For example, a guilty plea may be found involuntary if the
accused has been induced to enter it by deception, unfulfilled promises,
misrepresentations, unethical threats, or improper promises not related to
the prosecutor's business or the case at hand, such as bribes and thirdparty promises. 144 Thus, to continue the analogy to corporate waivers, if
a prosecutor promised to refrain from indicting a corporation if the
corporation waived its privileges, and then indicted the corporation
anyway, the waiver could be deemed involuntary. However, regardless
of the financial effects an indictment may have upon a corporation, no
matter how onerous the decision to assert the privilege may be, a mere
threat of indictment when properly made cannot be construed to coerce a
waiver of a corporation's attorney-client privilege, when that waiver is
given knowingly and intelligently and/or upon advice of counsel.
III. CONCLUSION

Neither the DOJ's general policy of considering waiver of the
privilege in its charging decisions, nor the pressure to waive the privilege
that prosecutors may apply, rises to the level of coercion. At all times,
the corporation has a choice. Based upon a weighing of its financial
interests, and upon the advice of experienced counsel, a corporation may
or may not choose to waive its privilege. This may be a difficult choice,
but it is a choice nonetheless, and it is the same kind of choice individual
criminal defendants face every day.
This is not to say that corporate coercion could never occur.
However, coercion requires a wrongful act or serious error. For
example, a corporation could be coerced if a court erroneously orders
disclosure of privileged information after the corporation has asserted its
privilege; if a prosecutor makes a baseless and wrongful threat of
indictment to obtain the waiver; or if a prosecutor fails to keep a promise
made in exchange for the waiver.
Finding that the threat of indictment alone is sufficient to coerce a
143 See In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Whether characterized
as forcing a party in between a Scylla and Charybdis, a rock and a hard place, or some other tired but
equally evocative metaphoric cliche, the 'Hobson's choice' argument is unpersuasive given the facts
of this case. An allegation that a party facing a federal investigation and the prospect of a civil fraud
suit must make difficult choices is insufficient justification for carving a substantial exception to the
waiver doctrine.").
144 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984); 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 686; 22
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 487.
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corporate waiver requires one of two results: (1) either corporations
accused of criminal activity are to be treated with more sensitivity than
individual criminal defendants who also suffer the collateral impacts of
indictment; or (2) threat of indictment must also be treated as coercing
individual waivers. Neither result works. The former suggests,
illogically, that corporations, in spite of the sophistication of their
officers, directors and corporate counsel, are somehow more susceptible
to coercion than an individual defendant facing criminal charges. The
latter breaks down our entire system of criminal justice, as plea bargains
and settlements become improper per se and every defendant who
waived a right in exchange for leniency may claim coercion.
The proper source of protection for the corporate attorney-client
privilege is the legislature. Policymakers may decide that corporate
disclosures of privileged information to government agents are of
sufficient value to society to warrant creating an exception to the waiver
doctrine. Such legislation is currently pending. The proposed AttorneyClient Privilege Act of 2007 would prevent the DO] from including a
corporation's waiver of the privilege as an element of cooperation. In·
the meantime, courts should not treat corporations with favoritism by
allowing these sophisticated parties to claim that a threat of indictment is
sufficient to coerce their actions.
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